The number of people using fitness devices and mobile health applications creates unprecedented amounts of healthrelated fitness data. In the United States, healthcare regulations do not consider the data that these devices collect as protected health information when no covered entity is involved; therefore, the law does not provide such data with the same legal protections as an individual's health records. Thus, users must ensure that they keep their data safe from potential data breaches and malicious activities. In this study, we analyze users' motivations to implement safeguards to protect their private health-related fitness data. To test user motivation, we issued wearable activity tracking devices and an associated online health fitness data account to students. We instructed the students about how to use the fitness device and how the device connected to the user's phone and Web-based application. We then had them complete a survey to determine how they form their threat perceptions and other factors influencing their avoidance motivations for computer-security incidents. With the exception of safeguard cost and privacy concerns, results support a revised threat calculus in the TTAT model and the original model constructs.
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Introduction
In recent years, products for tracking fitness and health-related data have inundated the wearable technology market. Forecasters predict the use of fitness wearables would jump from the 127.7 million in 2017 devices to over 240 million by 2021 and that smart watches will increase from 71.4 million to 121 million users in that same period (Lamkin, 2017) . These wearable devices couple with a user's phone and connect to the Internet via mobile health applications. As such, they generate an unprecedented amount of data related to individual health and fitness activities and present new opportunities for security breaches and other malicious activities (Barcena, Wueest, & Lau, 2014) .
How users perceive threats to their data and the steps they take to protect their information play a key role in whether they avoid security problems. Health information data has greater value for hackers than financial data because unauthorized access provides the information needed to file fraudulent medical claims and receive unauthorized payments or medical treatment (Yaraghi, 2016) . Indeed, in the United States, data breaches have compromised 50 percent of the population's health information (Widup, Bassett, Hylender, Rudis, & Spitler, 2015) . While personal fitness data do not fit into the legal confines of personal health information, wearable technology applications collect many related elements, such as users' full names, birthdates, mailing addresses, email addresses, photographs (Barcena et al., 2014) , passwords (Cyr, Horn, Miao, & Specter, 2014) , weight, heart rate, sleep patterns (Weinstein, 2015) , activities, and GPS location (McGee, 2016) . In the absence of the protections that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) act and other regulations provide, users must recognize the risks and have the motivation to protect their data. Fortunately, some fitness technology vendors recognize the serious nature of these threats and offer HIPAA-compliant protections even though they do not need to follow HIPAA requirements since the HIPAA does not consider them as covered entities (Fitbit, 2015) .
While the threat from using Fitbits and other wearable technology devices might seem innocuous, a vector of attacks exists between the Fitbit device and the user's smartphone via Bluetooth and continues between the smartphone and user's private data stored on the Fitbit website (Cyr et al., 2014) . Further, some devices send plaintext passwords over SMS (Do, Martini, & Choo, 2017) . Recently, cybercriminals used Fitbit accounts to collect customer data, such as their GPS history/location and the time they typically went to sleep (McGee, 2016) . This type of information poses not only a data threat but also a personal security threat.
Since users must protect their own fitness data, we need to know what motivates users to avoid threats and take protective actions. Researchers have studied various theoretical models when analyzing user motivations to avoid threats including protection motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975; Barcena et al., 2014) and technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) (Liang & Xue, 2009 ). In TTAT, user perceived severity and perceived susceptibility represent key constructs for evaluating threat perceptions and predicting user avoidance behaviors.
In this study, we examine the effect of perceived susceptibility, threat, and severity on the resulting user threat avoidance motivations and behaviors. Thus, we evaluate and extend TTAT in the wearable activity tracker context to understand how users perceive threats; what motivates them to avoid threats; how they react to threats; and what safeguards, costs, and concerns influence those motivations and behaviors.
Literature Review
Researchers have long examined people's perceptions of threats and privacy. Protection motivation theory and technology threat avoidance theory represent two important theories that explain user perceptions and motivations.
Protection Motivation Theory
Protection motivation theory (PMT), which Rogers (1975) originally proposed, identifies how individuals develop appropriate responses to threats. PMT suggests that, prior to reacting to threats, individuals navigate a thought process that ultimately determines their response. Initially, PMT suggested individuals assign a level of severity to the threat while simultaneously gauging the likelihood that the threat would affect them personally. In addition, individuals also examine possible responses to the threat and the responses' ability to protect them. As a result, the appraised severity, expectancy of exposure, and belief in efficacy of coping response interact to motivate individuals to implement a protective mechanism and ultimately respond (Rogers, 1975) . Figure 1 shows the constructs and relationships in the original PMT model.
Figure 1. Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1975)
Rogers (1983) modified PMT to include susceptibility and vulnerability, while Maddux and Rogers (1983) extended it to include self-efficacy as an integral construct for forming protection motivations. They proposed that individuals must not only believe the response mechanism will effectively protect them from a threat but also believe in their ability to implement the protection mechanism. In their study, Maddux and Rogers (1983) confirmed self-efficacy as an additional construct for predicting intentions to implement protective responses.
Many studies have analyzed protection motivation in a variety of contexts. Studies with PMT as the foundational theory have incorporated the concept of protecting oneself from threats associated with using technology. Specifically, PMT has served as the basis for studies in the context of wireless security systems, information security compliance, Internet usage, anti-virus software, and mobile devices (Woon, Tan, & Low, 2005; Lee, Larose, & Rifon, 2008; Chenoweth, Minch, & Gattiker, 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012; Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Chou & Chou, 2016; Tsai et al., 2016) .
While researchers have widely used PMT to determine user protection motivations, mixed results indicate it is not the best fit for explaining why users implement behaviors to avoid technological threats. Woon et al. (2005) analyzed the factors that cause homeowners to implement protective behaviors when using a wireless security system. They tested the full PMT model and added response cost as a construct. Their findings confirmed the significance of perceived severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cost. However, they found that perceived susceptibility was not significant in determining protective behaviors. Likewise, other studies have identified that perceived susceptibility was not significant in predicting protective motivations. The context of these studies included Internet usage and compliance with information security policies in the work environment (Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Vance et al., 2012; Yoon, Hwang, & Kim, 2012; Tsai et al., 2016) . Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) studied students' protection motivations when using personal devices at university and at home. Interestingly, they found perceived susceptibility predicted protective motivations in the university setting but not at home (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015) . Conversely, perceived susceptibility was significant in the context of Internet usage and compliance with information security policies in other studies (Lee et al., 2008; Chenoweth et al., 2009; Ifinedo, 2012) . Although these studies had similar contexts, they found different results regarding the influence that perceived susceptibility has on protection motivation. PMT studies have also returned mixed results regarding perceived severity, self-efficacy, cost, and safeguard effectiveness. Lee et al. (2008) found that perceived severity had no significance in the context of online behaviors and information security policy compliance. Ifinedo (2012) found that cost was not significant in determining compliance with information security policies. Chenoweth et al. (2009) found that self-efficacy failed to predict protective motivations for college students in an online environment, and Chou and Chou (2016) found that cost was not significant in the context of teachers' motivation to avoid technological threats. The prevalence of mixed results among studies based on PMT highlights the need for a model that can better determine the process by which individuals develop intentions and behaviors for avoiding technological threats.
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory
The technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) that Liang and Xue (2009) propose resembles protection motivation theory but better suits IT-related disciplines. The theory proposes that users are motivated to employ safeguards when they perceive threats, which suggests that threat perceptions influence users' motivation to invoke a safeguarding mechanism. Liang and Xue (2010) examined these associations including users' perceptions about susceptibility, severity, threat, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard costs, self-efficacy, avoidance motivation, and avoidance behavior. Liang and Xue (2010) drew from PMT and incorporated threat appraisal into the TTAT model. They posited perceived severity and perceived susceptibility as antecedents to perceived threat. They defined perceived severity as the level of harm malicious threats would cause the user. They defined perceived susceptibility as the likelihood that malicious threats would produce negative consequences for the user. Additionally, they expected perceived severity and perceived susceptibility to interact with each other to increase threat perceptions (Liang & Xue, 2010) . They expected these two constructs to explain the level of a user's threat perceptions, which they termed the threat calculus.
The TTAT model also incorporated a coping appraisal process similar to PMT, which included the selfefficacy, safeguard effectiveness, and safeguard cost. Liang and Xue (2010) defined self-efficacy as users' perception of their ability to implement the safeguarding measure. They defined safeguard effectiveness as users' perception that the safeguarding measure would actually provide protection. They defined safeguard cost as the impact implementing the safeguarding measure would have on users, which included monetary and time implications. Liang and Xue (2010) proposed these constructs would affect avoidance motivation. Additionally, they anticipated an interaction between safeguard effectiveness and perceived threat would negatively affect avoidance motivation.
Behavioral constructs in the TTAT model included avoidance motivation and avoidance behavior. Liang and Xue (2010) defined avoidance motivation as users' level of motivation to avoid technology threats by implementing protective actions. They defined avoidance behaviors as the actual actions taken to avoid the threats. Figure 2 shows the constructs in the original technology threat avoidance theory.
From reviewing the TTAT literature, we confirmed that researchers have used the theory in many different IT contexts and that it has much flexibility in explaining threat-avoidance behavior. Prior studies have revealed inconsistencies regarding the significance of severity, susceptibility, and the interaction between the two antecedents of threat. The lack of consistent results suggests a need to review the placement of susceptibility in the threat calculus. In their original test, Liang and Xue (2010) found both severity and susceptibility to be significant in determining threat perceptions; however, they found that the interaction between severity and susceptibility was not significant in the threat-appraisal process.
Subsequent studies that used the TTAT model continued to return mixed results regarding the relationships between susceptibility, severity, and threat, which calls into question the associations between these constructs and their influence on threat perceptions. In the context of game-based phishing attacks, Arachchilage and Love (2013) found susceptibility, severity, and the interaction between the two to be significant in determining threat perceptions. Other studies in the contexts of online threat avoidance and compliance with password security guidelines found susceptibility and severity to be significant but did not test the interaction between the two (Mwagwabi, 2015; Chen & Zahedi, 2016) . Young, Carpenter, and McLeod (2016) replicated the full TTAT model in the context of avoiding malware. They found a significant association between severity and threat. However, they did not find support for a relationship between susceptibility and threat or for an interaction between susceptibility and severity. Manzano (2012) tested the full TTAT model in the context of users' avoiding IT threats at home. The author surveyed two groups for comparison. The first group comprised individuals who worked in a non-IT setting. The second group comprised IT experts. The author surveyed both groups to assess their ITavoidance practices at home. The author found mixed results for the threat-appraisal process. Specifically, the author found support for relationship between susceptibility and threat for the first group but not for the second. Both groups indicated a significant relationship between severity and threat, while neither group supported the interaction between susceptibility and severity. Das and Khan (2016) incorporated susceptibility, severity, and the interaction between severity and susceptibility into an expectancy-based model to analyze the steps smartphone users take to avoid malicious threats via their devices. Das and Khan conducted their study on three groups: iPhone users, Blackberry users, and Android users. Susceptibility and severity were significant only for Blackberry users. The authors did not find support for an interaction between susceptibility and severity.
Other studies that have tested a partial TTAT model have also returned mixed results. Vance, Anderson, Kirwan, and Eargle (2014) tested severity and susceptibility in the context of determining individuals' risktaking behaviors by measuring their responses to security warnings. Vance et al. (2014) tested participants prior to experiencing a malware incident and again after experiencing a malware incident. They found mixed results between the pre-test and post-test regarding the significance of susceptibility and severity in predicting risk-taking behaviors. In the pre-test (before a security incident), neither susceptibility nor severity were significant for either group. In the post-test (following a security incident), susceptibility was significant for both groups, but severity was not significant.
In the context of detecting and avoiding fake websites, Zahedi, Abbasi, and Chen (2015) included severity and susceptibility in their model's threat appraisal. They surveyed two groups: participants who used online banking websites and participants who used online pharmacies. The authors did not find support for susceptibility for either group, but they did find support for severity for participants who used online banking sites.
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Inconsistent Results
The number of studies that have used TTAT in part or in whole to analyze threat appraisals and the resulting avoidance behaviors provide support for TTAT's applicability in information security research. However, the lack of consistent results regarding the significance of susceptibility and severity in the threat-appraisal process suggests that revising the TTAT model might better explain how individuals develop threat perceptions. Table 1 summarizes studies that detail the varied associations of perceived susceptibility, severity, and threat. 
Privacy
Increases in the data that mobile devices and wearable technologies collect suggest that theoretical frameworks should also incorporate privacy concerns as a key construct in determining users' avoidance behaviors. Matt and Peckelsen (2016) added privacy concerns and previous privacy experience as control variables in research examining users' intentions to use privacy-enhancing technologies. They adapted the privacy concerns construct for their study from Dinev and Hart (2006) , who described privacy concerns as perceptions that individuals develop in response to organizations' sharing their personal data for economic gain. Matt and Peckelsen (2016) operationalized past experience as participants' prior exposure to privacy violations. They found that both privacy concerns and previous privacy experience had a strong influence on users' intentions to implement privacy-enhancing technologies.
Some studies have emphasized the need to understand how individuals develop their privacy concerns and, therefore, focused on identifying antecedents to privacy concerns. Junglas, Johnson, and Spitzmüller (2008) explored the importance of personality traits in predicting concern for privacy in the context of using location-based services. They confirmed the personality traits agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience significantly influenced concern for privacy. Xu, Dinev, Smith, and Hart (2011) examined the factors that influence privacy concerns in the context of organizational information practices. Their research confirmed disposition to value privacy, privacy risk, and privacy control had strong effects on privacy concerns. Other research has analyzed users' privacy perceptions in the context of online privacy. Clemons and Wilson (2015) surveyed families and teenagers in eight countries to measure their privacy concerns. Specifically, they examined how external organizations mined students' text messages and school-issued email accounts for data so that they could conduct targeted ad campaigns. Although the level of concern varied among countries and between parents and their students, all groups surveyed had significant concerns about the invasion of privacy and the potential consequences. In the context of online shopping, Dinev and Hart (2006) incorporated an extension of privacy in their model to analyze an apparent paradox between consumers' stated privacy concerns and their online-shopping behaviors. They found that an increased perception of Internet privacy risk positively affects privacy concerns. As a result, increased Internet privacy concerns negatively affected the willingness to provide personal information in transactions on the Internet.
In summary, many studies have included privacy in research, especially in the context of online activities and organizational usage of personal data. The proliferation of electronically available data increases the need to understand these interactions. Therefore, we need to consider the impact that privacy concerns have on individual behavior and account for that impact in health information research.
Research Questions
In this study, we examine how people judge threats, perceive privacy, and are motivated to avoid harm. Inconsistent results in prior work bring into question the relationships associated with threat determination, privacy, and user motivation. Based on the literature and results from previous studies, we developed two research questions (RQ):
RQ1: How do perceived susceptibility and severity influence an individual's threat perceptions?
RQ2: Do privacy perceptions affect user motivation to implement technology safeguards?
We derived a final research question from previous TTAT studies with consistent results. The remaining constructs in our model, including avoidance motivation, self-efficacy, safeguard cost, safeguard effectiveness, and avoidance behavior were identical in placement to the original TTAT model. Although these constructs returned consistent results in prior studies, revisions to the threat calculus and the introduction of privacy concerns required us to determine reliability and validity, and therefore analyze the complete model. To be consistent with prior research, we fashioned the following research question to include these relationships:
RQ3: Will the relationships in the original TTAT model remain significant given the changes to the threat calculus?
Research Model and Hypotheses
In this study, we extend and refine the full TTAT model. RQ1 examines the relationship between perceived susceptibility and severity of threats when individuals develop threat perceptions. Researchers have found mixed results for susceptibility's occurrence or timing when determining its impact on threat perceptions. In our study, we identify whether users must first feel susceptible to a threat in order to form a perception about its severity. If perceived susceptibility is an antecedent to perceived severity, removing the interaction with perceived susceptibility as Liang and Xue (2010) tested may indicate whether users have stronger threat perceptions as a direct result of susceptibility. Replicating the original Liang and Xue (2010) work, Young et al. (2016) did not find support for an association between susceptibility and threat, nor the interaction between susceptibility and severity; therefore, in this research, we examine perceived susceptibility as an antecedent to perceived severity.
Liang and Xue (2010) did not consider privacy concerns; however, we posit that privacy concerns affect user motivation. Therefore, we revised the model and inserted the privacy construct into the model as an antecedent to avoidance motivation. Due to the sensitive nature of data that fitness wearables collect, our model examines whether privacy concerns increased avoidance motivation. Figure 3 shows the refined relationships between the constructs and their associated hypotheses.
Figure 3. Model and Hypotheses
We developed hypotheses to examine the refined TTAT model. In response to prior works and to explore the modified relationships between these constructs, we position perceived susceptibility as an antecedent to perceived severity in the threat calculus. We posit the following hypotheses from the research questions and model:
H1a: Perceived susceptibility positively influences perceived severity.
H1b: Perceived severity positively influences threat perceptions.
H1c: Perceived threat positively influences avoidance motivation.
Previous research has focused on the impact that privacy concerns have on technology acceptance. However, little research has incorporated privacy concerns in the threat-avoidance context (Herath et al., 2014) . Thus, we examine the impact that privacy concerns have on threat avoidance and hypothesize that:
H2: Privacy concerns positively influence avoidance motivation.
In order to evaluate their motivation to avoid malicious threats to IT, users must first assess their ability to do so. Self-efficacy refers to the certainty that users place on their ability to implement protective measures. Users who believe in their abilities are typically more likely to enact a safeguard (Liang & Xue, 2010) . Therefore, we hypothesize that: H3: Self-efficacy positively influences avoidance motivation.
Safeguard measures require financial and intellectual commitments from users, which causes them to evaluate the safeguard cost. Users must determine if the financial burden or intellectual impact will impede their productivity. Users may be less likely to adopt safeguarding measures that require an undue amount of time, hassle, or money (Liang & Xue, 2010) . Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H4: Safeguard cost negatively influences avoidance motivation.
While safeguard cost and self-efficacy are important for determining avoidance motivation, user perceptions about safeguard effectiveness are equally important. Unless users perceive the safeguard to be an effective tool for avoiding malware, they are unlikely to implement it (Liang & Xue, 2010) . Therefore, we hypothesize that: Prior research has demonstrated a strong relationship between motivation and behavior (Liang & Xue, 2010; Arachchilage & Love, 2013) . Once users develop avoidance motivation, they are likely to implement the safeguarding measure (Liang & Xue, 2010; Young et al., 2016) . In keeping with consistent results from prior studies, we hypothesize that:
H6: Avoidance motivation positively influences avoidance behavior.
Methodology
We used a survey to test the revised TTAT model and resulting hypotheses. The survey asked respondents about their perceptions about their susceptibility to threats and about threats' severity while using wearable activity trackers that connected via Bluetooth to their phones and, subsequently, to the Fitbit website via the Internet. We briefly explained Bluetooth and network vulnerabilities to the subjects during a pre-survey overview of security issues that can often occur when one uses wearable activity trackers in general.
We adapted 38 items that we used in the survey from the measures that Liang and Xue (2010) used. We adapted the four questions we used to assess privacy concerns from Matt and Peckelsen (2016) . Other researchers previously validated all the TTAT measures we adapted; however, we revalidated them due to minor wording changes based on reviewing the literature. For example, "malware" was more encompassing than "spyware", so we updated the terminology (Manzano, 2012; Young et al., 2018) . We modified some items to fit our study's context (i.e., the Fitbit system). The original TTAT items used mixed scales drawn from both semantic differential and Likert-based questions. Some items ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree, others from not at all confident to totally confident, and still others from innocuous to extremely devastating (Liang & Xue, 2010; Young et al., 2018) . We standardized the scale for this study to provide consistent wording for each measure and used a typical seven-point Likert scale construction that included strongly disagree, disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, agree, and strongly agree.
Data Collection
First-year college students who had not previously used a Fitbit activity tracker served as the participants for our study. We sent the participant recruitment survey to 3,301 incoming first-year students who we selected based on their age and their college classification. Of that number, 747 students completed the recruitment survey, and we invited the first 100 that responded to participate in the study. Subsequently, we held a training session in which we issued the 98 students that attended a Fitbit and overviewed the Fitbit system, how it functioned, and the types of data it collected. After the presentation, we asked the participants to respond to the data-collection survey. The survey instrument contained measures for the latent variable constructs and demographic variables. In all, the survey contained nine blocks of items. Each block contained between two and six Likert-scale construct questions (see Appendix B).
Analysis
We collected 92 survey responses from 98 participants (a 94% response rate). We designed our study to examine first-year students' activities and perceptions; therefore, all respondents unsurprisingly selected into the 18-24 age bracket. With regard to gender, 30.4 percent of the participants were male, and the remaining 69.6 percent selected female. The sample comprised various ethnicities (40% Hispanic, 39% White, 13% African American, 7% Asian, and 2% other). Our design constrained the participants' highest education level: 44 percent reported having a high school degree and 52 percent had some college credits.
We analyzed the data using SmartPLS (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005) . This statistical tool can evaluate both large and small sample sizes (Chin, 1998) and can effectively handle interval or ratio responses. Because SmartPLS uses bootstrap resampling, data does not have to be normally distributed (Vinzi, Trinchera, & Amato, 2010) .
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consistently reflect the underlying latent variable, whereas validity ensures the instrument measures the intended relationships in the model (DeVellis, 2003; Tavakol & Dennick, 2011) . We first evaluated individual item consistency by using Cronbach's alpha. All items scored higher than 0.70 and, thus, demonstrated adequate reliability. Perceived threat scored the lowest at 0.85. Table 2 provides the Cronbach's alpha values and average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct. After establishing construct reliability, we assessed construct validity by testing both convergent and discriminant validity. Discriminant validity establishes a clear difference between constructs (Trochim, 2006) by measuring the amount of shared variance between the latent variables in the model as opposed to the amount of variance due to error (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) . To substantiate discriminant validity, one should calculate the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) and ensure the value is at least .50. Values greater than 0.70 indicate that one can attribute a large amount of variance to a specific variable (Alarcón & Sánchez, 2015) . One then compares the AVE values for the latent variables to the correlations with the other constructs. As long as the AVE values are higher than the correlations with the other constructs, the model demonstrates discriminant validity. The AVE values were greater than any correlational value by construct, and the factors had greater on-factor than off-factor loadings; therefore, the measurement model demonstrated satisfactory discriminant validity (see Table 3 ). Convergent validity confirms the items measured the intended constructs. Gefen, Rigdon, and Straub (2011) suggest that one evaluate the convergent validity of individual items via a factor analysis. Basically, all factor loadings for individual items should be greater than 0.70 (see Appendix A). The lowest on-factor To assess common method bias, we performed a factor analysis and examined both the Eigenvalues and scree plots of our unrotated solution. Not constraining the number of factors in our 44-item survey produced a nine-factor solution with Eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and accounted for 81.77 percent of the variance in this sample. Next, we ran the factor analysis and constrained the number of solutions to a single factor. The unifocal solution had an Eigenvalue of 12.27 and accounted for only 27.87 percent of the variance in this sample. Testing for common method variance in this post hoc way can detect bias conditions found in survey research (Fuller, Simmering, Atinc, Atinc, & Babin, 2016) ; therefore, these results indicate that common method variance did not likely affect our sample.
Results
The above analysis generated significant results. We calculated the R 2 values or variances extracted for all dependent variables. The model accounted for a significant portion of the variance in avoidance behavior, avoidance motivation, perceived threat, and perceived severity. After determining the path coefficients and variance values, we performed a test of significance for each path. Table 4 reports the sample mean, standard deviation, t-statistic, and corresponding p value for each relationship specified in the model. The model's beta coefficients indicated significant support for the hypothesized relationships except for H2 and H4. Specifically, perceived susceptibility had a significant effect on perceived severity (β = .40, ρ < 0.01, R 2 = .16), which supports H1. Perceived severity had a significant effect on perceived threat (β = .51, ρ < 0.01, R 2 = .26), which supports H1b. Perceived threat had a significant effect on avoidance motivation (β = .24, ρ = 0.04), which supports H1c. Privacy concerns did not have a significant effect on avoidance motivation (β = .13, ρ < 0.20), which does not support H2. Self-efficacy (β = .33, ρ < 0.01) had a significant effect on avoidance motivation, which supports H3. Safeguard cost had a negative and non-significant association with avoidance motivation (β = -.20, ρ = 0.06), which does not support H4. Safeguard effectiveness had a significant effect on avoidance motivation (β = .29, ρ < 0.01), which supports H5. Finally, avoidance motivation had a significant effect on avoidance behavior (β = .46, ρ < 0.01), which supports H6. Figure 4 shows the results.
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Discussion
In this study, we examine users' motivations for implementing safeguarding measures against potential threats. We revise the TTAT model to measure user perceptions and motivations in the context of a wearable activity-tracker system. Due to mixed results in prior studies, we propose perceived susceptibility as an antecedent to perceived severity in the threat calculus. When compared to the original TTAT test and other studies based on the TTAT model, our study further confirms the model's suitability for evaluating avoidance motivations and behaviors and offers an alternative approach for modeling antecedents that involve perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, and perceived threat.
Due to the sensitive nature of data that activity-tracker systems collect, we extend the model to include a privacy construct to determine whether privacy concerns increase avoidance motivation. Surprisingly, we found that privacy concerns were not significant in determining avoidance motivation. Wearable fitness devices collect sensitive data that resembles protected health information. However, user responses suggested that they lacked concern about the data that the devices collect-possibly due to our participants' age (i.e., 18-24). Also, participants in this age group may be less likely to have experienced severe consequences from data breaches and privacy violations. Additionally, we note that privacy concerns were more highly correlated with perceived susceptibility, severity, and threat. We did not analyze the associations between these variables and only tested the relationships between privacy concerns and avoidance motivation and avoidance behavior.
In Table 5 , we show the significance of each construct in our own and prior studies. As the table shows, avoidance motivation significantly predicted avoidance behavior in each study. Perceived threat and safeguard effectiveness both had a significant and positive influence on avoidance motivation. Likewise, perceived severity had a significant and strong effect on perceived threat. Safeguard cost had a significant but negative influence on avoidance motivation in most studies, which indicates that, as safeguard costs increase, users have less motivation to implement the safeguard measure. However, for our study, safeguard cost was only marginally significant (p = .06). Self-efficacy generally indicated a significant effect on avoidance motivation, although one study found it was not significant. Additionally, perceived susceptibility was significant in three of the four studies that had a direct path to perceived threat (Liang & Xue, 2010) . The modifications we made to the TTAT model returned interesting results. For instance, positioning perceived susceptibility as an antecedent to perceived severity in the threat calculus resulted in a strong and significant effect, which suggests that users might first evaluate the likelihood of falling victim to malware before they evaluate the severity of such a threat. In their larger study, Carpenter et al. (2018) repeated this relationship and found it to be significant, which indicates that revising the threat calculus can provide more consistent results than previous versions of the TTAT model. Future studies measuring the modified threat calculus would help determine if the revisions apply in various contexts.
Our results provide insight into users' motivations to avoid malicious IT threats. Prior research confirming the original TTAT model's suitability for evaluating technology threat avoidance verifies the foundational constructs' stability. However, the lack of consistency in the variables associated with the threat calculus indicates the need to consider other factors. Additional variables such as risk propensity and distrust propensity may more richly measure the threat-appraisal process (Young et al., 2018) . As the need to better understand users' threat-avoidance motivations and behaviors increases, a modified and improved TTAT model might benefit researchers.
Conclusion
In this study, we examine and refine the threat calculus in TTAT in order to provide a more representative model for analyzing user motivations to employ safeguard measures. In addition to the revised threat calculus in our model, we introduce a privacy construct to further extend and analyze user motivations. While privacy concerns and safeguard cost were not significant in our study, we found full support for the revised threat calculus that explored perceived susceptibility as an antecedent to perceived severity rather than an antecedent to threat perceptions. However, the variance in perceived threat and avoidance motivation was lower in this study than in the original TTAT model that Liang and Xue (2010) tested, which indicates other variables may affect threat perceptions and avoidance motivation. To further explain the variance in threat perceptions, researchers might consider possible antecedents to privacy concerns. Just as users must evaluate susceptibility and severity to determine threat perceptions, they might also consider various factors when analyzing their privacy concerns. The amount of personal health information stored in complex systems, such as the Fitbit system, calls for further considering users' privacy concerns. Constructs related to negative experiences with data breaches and privacy violations Volume 45 10.17705/1CAIS.04505 Paper 5 could provide further insight into how users develop privacy concerns and their resulting avoidance motivations.
Limitations
While we make progress towards a model that allows one to better analyze technology threat avoidance, our study design has some limitations. Because we limited participation to first-year college students, respondents were approximately the same age. Future work should employ a more heterogeneous sample in order to improve generalizability.
Another concern relates to the items we used to measure self-efficacy. As Carpenter et al. (2018) note, one might need to redesign the measures for self-efficacy to better fit the context of technology threatavoidance behaviors. We slightly modified the items that Liang and Xue (2010) used for this study, so they might not truly indicate users' confidence in implementing a safeguarding measure. While we found selfefficacy to be significant with this study group, prior inconsistencies suggest modifications to the selfefficacy measure might be beneficial.
Contributions and Implications for Future Research
The results provide several contributions for researchers and organizations. By continuing to refine and evaluate the TTAT model in various contexts, researchers have access to a modified model that might better assess and determine user motivations and behaviors. Our model introduces the privacy construct to TTAT. Although we found that it was not significant with the group we examined, it deserves further evaluation. Theoretically considering it as an antecedent to susceptibility, severity, and threat might provide more insight into the role privacy plays in user motivations.
We examined first-year students from 18 to 24 years old, which suggests that individuals around this age might have different perspectives on privacy of personal fitness systems. Also, due to their age, our participants may have had limited exposure to the risks of data and privacy breaches, which may have minimized their concerns about privacy. A larger study with a more heterogeneous group of participants might yield different responses regarding privacy concerns.
Organizations can benefit from these results because the model provides a framework for understanding how users develop threat perceptions. In this study, placing perceived susceptibility as an antecedent to perceived severity indicated a significant effect on threat perceptions. As such, organizations should consider addressing users' perceptions about susceptibility when determining the best method for motivating them to comply with security policies. Because this study constitutes the initial study to relocate perceived susceptibility in the threat calculus, future research in different contexts would assist in determining if this modification returns consistently significant results.
Previous studies returned mixed results for the threat calculus (severity, susceptibility, and threat). In this work, we consider a revision to the threat calculus. Future research should comprehensively test all relationships between severity, susceptibility, and threat to determine if a mediated model might be more appropriate. It is extremely likely that the Fitbit system will contain malware in the future.
SUS2
The chances of getting malware on the Fitbit system are great.
SUS3
There is a good possibility that the Fitbit system will contain malware at some point.
SUS4
There is a good chance that there will be malware on the Fitbit system at some point in the future.
SUS5
The Fitbit system is at risk of becoming a victim of malware.
SUS6
It is possible that the Fitbit system will experience a malware incident.
Perceived severity
SEV1
The consequences of losing my fitness data from the Fitbit system could be severe.
SEV2
Malware could steal my fitness data from the Fitbit system without my knowledge.
SEV3
My fitness data collected by malware could be misused by cyber criminals.
SEV4
Malware could invade my privacy through the Fitbit system.
SEV5
My fitness data collected by malware could be subjected to unauthorized secondary use.
SEV6
Fitness data collected by malware could be used to commit crimes against me.
Perceived threat
THR1
The consequences of getting malware on the Fitbit system threatens me.
THR2
Malware is a danger to the Fitbit system.
THR3
It would be awful if the Fitbit system was infected by malware.
THR4
It would be risky to use the Fitbit system if it had malware.
THR5 I am worried that using the Fitbit system will negatively affect me.
THR6 I am scared that the Fitbit system will have harmful consequences for me.
Privacy concerns PRI1
I am concerned that the information I submit to the Fitbit system could be misused.
PRI2
I am concerned that a person can find private information about me on the Fitbit system.
PRI3
I am concerned about submitting information on the Fitbit system, because of what others might do with it.
PRI4
I am concerned about submitting information on the Fitbit system, because it could be used in a way I did not foresee.
Self-efficacy SLF1 I could successfully install and use security software if…I had seen someone else do it before trying myself.
SLF2
I could successfully install and use security software if…I could call someone for help if I got stuck.
SLF3
I could successfully install and use security software if…someone helped me get started.
SLF4
I could successfully install and use security software if…I had a lot of time to complete the task.
SLF5
I could successfully install and use security software if…someone showed me how to do it first.
SLF6
I could successfully install and use security software if…I had used a similar package before.
Safeguard cost CST1 I don't have security software on the Fitbit system because I don't know how to get it.
CST2
I don't have security software on the Fitbit system because it may cause problems with other programs.
CST3
I don't' have security software on the Fitbit system because installing it is too much trouble.
CST4
I don't have security software on the Fitbit system because I'm not aware such software exists. 
Safeguard effectiveness EFF1
Security software would be useful for detecting and removing malware from the Fitbit system.
EFF2
Security software would increase my ability to protect the Fitbit system from malware.
EFF3
Security software would enable me to search for and remove malware from the Fitbit system faster.
EFF4
Security software would enhance my effectiveness in finding and removing malware on the Fitbit system.
EFF5
Security software would make it easier to search for and remove malware on the Fitbit system.
EFF6
Security software would increase my productivity in searching for and removing malware on the Fitbit system.
Avoidance motivation MOT1 I intend to use security software to avoid malware breaches.
MOT2
I will use security software to avoid malware breaches.
MOT3
I plan to use security software to avoid malware breaches.
Avoidance behavior BEH1 I run security software regularly to remove malware.
BEH2
I update my security software regularly.
